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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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The Viet Minh army is undergoing an extensive
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accomplished largely through a reclassification of
personnel already under arms and is made possible
only by the continued heavy flow of illegal arms
shipments from Communist China. The Viet Minh may
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Indian prime minister Nehru's visit to Communist
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The Soviet Union has utilized the fifth anni-
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Soviet willingness to grant China the prestige of a
great-power ally. In their public statements, how-
ever, the Soviet leaders give no indication of in-
creased military and economic support.

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SECRET**FRENCH PERSONNEL CHANGES TEND TO FAVOR COMMUNISTS
AND HOBBLE PRO-AMERICANS Page 11**

While the current extensive reshuffling of key French government personnel appears to be primarily an effort by the Mendes-France regime to entrench itself, it has resulted in the transfer of many pro-American officials to relatively unimportant posts. There is also evidence that the government has followed a soft policy toward Communists. Current disclosures of Communist infiltration, however, will probably force Mendes-France to come to grips with the problem of Communist influence in the government.

**EGYPT FACES CRITICAL TEST OF ITS INFLUENCE IN THE
SUDAN Page 13**

A decline in Egypt's prestige and serious dissension within the governing National Unionist Party in the Sudan confront the Nasr regime with a critical test of its influence during the transitional period before the Sudanese vote on whether to join Egypt or become independent.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEW GOVERNMENT Page 14

The choice of the men who will fill the principal positions in the new Chinese Communist government discloses significant changes in the relative standing of the Chinese leaders, although the top four officials are not affected. Among those whose fortunes have risen are Peng Teh-huai, new minister of national defense; Teng Hsiao-ping, new Politburo member; and Li Fu-chun, new chairman of the State Planning Commission. Those who have apparently fallen from favor include Kao Kang, Li Li-san, Jao Shu-shih, and An Tzu-wen.

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SECRET**THE SOVIET WORLD**

The Soviet Union's initial comment on the London agreements described them as an "attempt to bring back EDC under another name," criticized British and French leaders for ignoring the wishes of their people on the German rearmament question, and depreciated the "sensational concessions by Britain" committing troops and a tactical air force to the Continent. For the benefit of German listeners, Moscow insisted that the London agreements are incompatible with German reunification.

As the Western Allies worked out their London agreement on West German rearmament, the USSR rapidly developed its campaign to frustrate Western community defense plans. Moscow's immediate aim seems to be to generate French public and parliamentary pressure to defer ratification of the London agreement pending further four-power talks. The Soviet leaders so far have chosen to offer as bait ostensible modifications of their earlier terms for world disarmament and an Austrian treaty.

Vyshinsky's UN disarmament proposal on 30 September was intended to appear as a substantial concession, with France as the principal target. Molotov gave a copy to the French ambassador the day before Vyshinsky's speech, and remarked that "account must be taken of the German problem."

Moscow's motivation in introducing the apparent concessions in its disarmament plan was also revealed by the French Communist press treatment of the subject. Communist dailies in Paris developed the theme that it is no longer essential to remilitarize Germany since with the Soviet disarmament concessions general disarmament will now be possible. The Soviet press carried extensive reports on the French reaction to Vyshinsky's proposal and attempted to create the impression that the French non-Communist press believed the proposal to be a step forward, making the rearming of West Germany unnecessary.

Moscow is keeping any new proposals on Germany in reserve, although past propaganda hints have suggested that specious concessions on the principle of free all-German elections may be forthcoming. The routine character of Moscow's initial comment on the London conference suggests that the Soviet leaders are still studying the situation created

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by the London agreements and may withhold any major counter-initiative until the moment of greatest impact on the French assembly's debate on ratification.

Moscow apparently is counting on strong opposition in the assembly to forestall early implementation of the London decisions. The Soviet press hinted at assembly rejection by quoting a French Communist paper to the effect that "it is one thing to draw up plans, but another thing to bring them to realization and to obtain the approval of public opinion." During the London conference, the Paris Communist daily L'Humanité hopefully predicted that "popular action" would render any decisions of principle reached at London a "dead letter, as the EDC is a dead letter."

Meanwhile, Moscow is strongly hinting through propaganda and its officials in Austria that it is ready to accept treaty limitations on the size and locations of its forces to remain there after the conclusion of a treaty. This small concession is well calculated to encourage the eagerness of Austrian leaders for a resumption of treaty discussions. The most recent Soviet propaganda on this new line flatly states, for the first time, that Austrian participation in the USSR's proposed European security pact would result in the withdrawal of all Soviet occupation forces.

Soviet efforts to normalize relations with Yugoslavia moved one small step forward with the conclusion of trade talks on 1 October. Representatives of Soviet foreign trade organizations and the Yugoslav Chamber of Foreign Trade signed in Belgrade an "arrangement" providing for about \$2,500,000 in trade each way. Twelve commodities are to be exchanged, the bulk of them by the end of this year.

A Yugoslav government official subsequently disclosed to the American embassy that the USSR had proposed further trade talks on a government rather than a state enterprise level. He said that the USSR indicated during the recently concluded trade talks a desire to develop extensive trade with the Yugoslavs. It is doubtful, however, that such trade would include any significant quantities of wheat, which Yugoslavia needs. Increased domestic and Satellite demands are likely to preclude the export of Soviet wheat in substantial quantities.

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SECRET**VIET MINH ARMY UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE REORGANIZATION
AND INCREASING ITS FIRE POWER**

The Viet Minh army is undergoing an extensive reorganization made possible by continuing illegal arms shipments from Communist China.

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Following the Geneva truce agreement of 22 July, the Communists embarked on an accelerated program of reorganization and training designed to develop a more modern army, one of greater fire power and capable of large-scale operations.

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The reorganization is being accomplished largely through a reclassification of personnel already under arms. Militia forces are being converted to regional and regular status, new battalions are being formed from regional companies, and independent battalions and regiments are regrouping to form new divisions. Although there has as yet been no significant numerical increase, some increment of the over-all strength is to be expected with the incorporation into the armed forces of Viet Minh war prisoners freed by the French and some Vietnamese army deserters and prisoners still held in northern Vietnam.

Without the continued flow of arms shipments from Communist China--in direct violation of the Geneva agreement, which prohibits the introduction of additional war materiel except on a replacement basis--a reorganization of this scope would not be possible. Since the cease-fire, this aid has resulted in a 50-percent increase in Viet Minh artillery weapons and has included enough mortars and recoilless rifles to equip five infantry divisions. Ammunition shipments have also been heavy.

The American army attaché in Saigon has pointed to the possibility that the Viet Minh hopes, through a significant strengthening of its armed forces' capabilities, to influence the vote in the elections scheduled for July 1956 in all of Vietnam. However, if the elections are canceled, or if the Communists lose them, the Viet Minh would still be in a favorable position for a rapid military conquest of the entire country.

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NEHRU'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PEIPING

Indian prime minister Nehru's visit to Communist China in mid-October is unlikely to result in any formal agreement other than a joint communiqué reiterating the desire of the two countries to live peacefully side by side.

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The publicity given by Nehru and Chou to the five principles of nonintervention and coexistence in the preamble of the Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet strongly suggests that Nehru considers this an adequate declaration of the peaceful intentions of both countries. His coolness toward another Colombo powers meeting and a conference of African and Asian powers supports the belief that he feels the principles have been sufficiently discussed. His apparent difficulty in evolving satisfactory working details for carrying out the principles is possibly one of the strongest factors militating against the idea that a new pact may come out of Peiping. An opening of diplomatic relations between China and Nepal, which may be announced after Nehru's return, could not be considered a result of the visit since India reportedly has already expressed itself in favor.

In addition, Nehru may feel that another bilateral or multilateral nonaggression or Locarno-type treaty with China could be interpreted as a leftward shift in India's orientation--an interpretation he would take pains to avoid. India now has no political commitments to Western nations other than those in the Commonwealth, and a pact with China would unbalance this situation. Nehru's sensitiveness on the question of neutrality was illustrated as recently as late September by his unwillingness to have China invited to the conference of African and Asian nations proposed by Indonesia.

Nehru's uneasiness over China's real intentions in Asia is illustrated by the fact that in June both he and the Burmese prime minister indicated to Chou their fears of Chinese aggression. Chou is said to have reassured them. In addition, Chou supposedly promised to look into the question of dual nationality of Chinese residents in Burma and Indonesia.

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China has not acted as yet, however, and Chinese activities and propaganda aimed at Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand have not been calculated to eliminate fear. In early September, Nehru expressed perturbation over the Chinese Communist shelling of Quemoy Island. Nehru is unlikely to enter into an agreement with China until he can satisfy himself as to China's intentions, especially if he is beginning to fear China's military might, since this might preclude his later seeking assistance from the West.

While Nehru publicly deplores the Manila pact, there is no sign he will make it a major issue either domestically or internationally or that he will seek a treaty with China to counteract it. Indonesian premier Ali Sastroamidjojo's failure when he was in New Delhi from 22 to 25 September to generate enthusiasm for a Locarno-type pact or even for a conference of Colombo or Afro-Asian powers is indicative of Nehru's unwillingness to be pushed at this time.

Nehru, probably better than Ali, recognizes the lack of support in Asia for a new nonaggression treaty. Pakistan is already committed to the Manila agreement. The Ceylonese government is sympathetic toward it. Even in Indonesia, there are strong objections to a nonaggression pact. The prospect for any firm agreement evolving from Nehru's visit to Peiping therefore appears to be dim.

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SECRET**CURRENT SOVIET ATTENTION TO CHINA**

The Soviet Union utilized the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic to make its most lavish demonstration to date of friendship and regard for China. The Soviet delegation to Peiping, headed by Khrushchev, and including his fellow Presidium members Bulganin and Mikoyan, the editor of Pravda and the minister of culture, was the highest level delegation to leave the USSR since Malenkov and Zhdanov went to the opening of the Cominform in 1947. This is the first time Soviet leaders of such stature have made a public visit to China. In Moscow the remaining six Presidium members, including Malenkov and Molotov, attended the Chinese ambassador's reception.

This unprecedented attention climaxes a growing Soviet acknowledgment over the past 18 months of the role of China in the Communist world. With the end of the Korean war, Moscow stepped up its promotion of China's stature as a world power whose recognition is essential for world peace and used the Geneva conference to reinforce this thesis. Since the death of Stalin, Moscow has also begun to recognize Mao as a Marxist theoretician, and this year accorded him the unusual honor of including him in the official philosophical dictionary, the only living Communist leader so listed.

This trend has been accompanied by Soviet economic aid to China which, although it has included key industrial and military equipment, has been modest in scale. There has been little emphasis by the USSR of its military commitment to Peiping under the Sino-Soviet treaty. Moscow has stressed instead, particularly since the Korean settlement, that China is the "stabilizing factor" for peace in the Far East. Peiping has always been far more eager to make explicit the joint obligations of the Sino-Soviet treaty than has Moscow.

China's recent moves against Formosa and the offshore islands have evoked little official response from the USSR. Soviet media have been cautious in reporting Chinese claims, initiating little independent comment and relying largely on quoting Chinese statements. Any mention of Soviet commitment under the Sino-Soviet treaty has been scrupulously avoided.

This general Soviet pattern was followed by Khrushchev in his address in Peiping on 2 October. The Soviet party leader paid great tribute to China's accomplishments in

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preparing for Socialism, reaffirmed the inviolability of Sino-Soviet friendship, and reiterated the current Soviet stress on peaceful coexistence. He commended Chou-En-lai's call for consultations among Asian powers based on his five principles of nonaggression.

Although Khrushchev gave the first general pledge of support by a top-ranking Soviet leader to Peiping's desire to "liberate" Formosa, he avoided the question of the kind, degree and timing of Soviet support. He made no mention of the Sino-Soviet treaty in connection with Formosa.

Ambassador Bohlen, in commenting on these points, noted that the Khrushchev speech seemed to put the USSR behind the Chinese position on Formosa, but that he found it difficult to believe Moscow was prepared to run a serious risk of involvement in a major war on this issue. He further reported that in Moscow, Malenkov, Molotov, and Voroshilov rather pointedly ignored any reference to the liberation of Formosa in their replies to the Chinese ambassador's toast to China's determination to achieve this goal.

Bohlen found further evidence of the USSR's desire to soft-pedal the degree of its commitment to the Formosa campaign in an unusual procedure employed by the Soviet censor in dealing with the Moscow AP correspondent's story on the Khrushchev speech. The censor pointed out that the journalist had incorrectly quoted Khrushchev as stating that the "Soviet Union supported China's determination" on the Formosa issue, whereas Khrushchev had merely said that the "Soviet people" supported this.

In his speech, Khrushchev failed to repeat the long-standing Soviet boast of having played the major role in defeating Japan in World War II. He acknowledged for the first time that the Soviet army came "to aid" the Chinese people after the USSR had defeated Hitler. He also went beyond any previous Soviet spokesman by explicitly crediting the Chinese Communist Party with having evolved the "brilliant strategy and tactics" of the Chinese revolution. He stated that the "Chinese people are advancing along the correct road of their own." Prior to Stalin's death, Soviet theoreticians had shown great reluctance to acknowledge the success of Mao's early tactics, which were at times in direct contrast to those proclaimed by the Comintern under Stalin.

Khrushchev spoke of future Soviet economic aid mainly in the form of assistance to the 141 projects announced in 1953 as the Soviet contribution to China's first Five-Year Plan. But the Chinese were assured "that the Soviet people will continue to be their trustworthy, true friends" and will support future Chinese development.

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SECRET**FRENCH PERSONNEL CHANGES TEND TO FAVOR COMMUNISTS
AND HOBBLE PRO-AMERICANS**

While the current extensive reshuffling of key French government personnel appears to be primarily an effort by the Mendes-France regime to entrench itself, it has resulted in the transfer of many pro-American officials to relatively unimportant posts. There is also evidence that the government has followed a "soft policy" toward Communists. The replacement of pro-American officials apparently springs from a desire for "more independent" policies; current disclosures of Communist infiltration, however, will probably force Mendes-France to come to grips with the problem of Communist influence in the government.

Personnel shifts in the Foreign Ministry have already removed from several key spots officials who were close to former foreign minister Bidault. While numerous transfers could be expected during what amounts to the first drastic administrative shake-up under the Fourth Republic, even the French press is speculating that the premier is deliberately shifting pro-American officials to relatively remote or inactive spots.

Among the most important changes has been the replacement of outspokenly pro-EDC Hervé Alphand, permanent delegate to NATO, by Maurice Couve de Murville, former ambassador to Egypt, who in the past has not hesitated to undercut Bidault's pro-American policies. Pro-American Guy de la Tournelle, since 1950 director of political affairs and third-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry, has been appointed ambassador to Spain.

Pierre de Leusse, who resigned last year as head of the Foreign Ministry's press section in protest against Bidault's pro-EDC policy, has just been appointed ambassador to Warsaw. The significance of this move may become clear if Pierre Charpentier, who is scheduled for a post abroad when his present office is set up as a new Ministry of Foreign Trade, is also assigned to an Orbit country. Charpentier is known to favor expanded East-West trade, has worked for a reduction in strategic trade controls, and claims to have Mendes-France's support for continued trade with north Vietnam.

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Considerable concern has been expressed in the press and among the opposition over the government's move to tighten control over channels of information. The recent appointment of a new director of the semiofficial Agence France Presse has been explained publicly by a government spokesman as a move to give the agency "a greater independence in its information." The new director is a close associate of Interior Minister Mitterrand, who has been regarded as lenient toward Communists. The appointment of a new director of the nationalized radio is also planned.

Mendes-France has already shown his willingness to manipulate the press. Just prior to the assembly vote on EDC, the government ordered AFP to withhold news of Britain's clarification of its stand on the defense community.

Even in the early weeks of the Mendes-France regime, when the premier was occupied at Geneva, there were indications the new government would follow a "soft policy" toward Communists. The reappointment of an avowed Communist to the National Center of Scientific Research in early July was noted by the American embassy in Paris as reversing the trend of previous governments toward removing Communists from sensitive positions.

Most recently, political adversaries of the premier have seized on the dismissal of police inspector Jean Dides, head of an anti-Communist section, as another indication of Mendes-France's bad faith and pro-Communist leanings. The subsequent revelation of information leaks by key defense officials to Communists has, however, removed the finger of suspicion from Mendes-France in this matter, although the extent of Mitterrand's involvement is still not clear.

The leaks of secret defense information, described in the press as "France's biggest postwar scandal," have already led to the questioning of top Communist leaders. An aroused public opinion will probably compel Mendes-France to give attention to the problem of his own relationship with the Communist Party. This may result in friction between the premier and some of his closest advisers.

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SECRET**EGYPT FACES CRITICAL TEST OF ITS INFLUENCE IN THE SUDAN**

Egyptian prestige in the Sudan has been impaired by recent developments in Cairo and by serious dissensions within the governing National Unionist Party in the Sudan. Popular support for the pro-Egyptian Unionist Party is threatened by growing coolness toward the Nasr regime among leaders of the important Moslem Khatmia sect. As the majority of the Unionist Party deputies belong to this sect, Prime Minister Azhari's prounionist policies may face new difficulties when the Sudanese parliament reconvenes in November.

Differences between Nagib and Nasr, further dissension within the Revolutionary Command Council, and the Cairo regime's policy toward the Moslem Brotherhood have lessened Sudanese desire for political union with Egypt. Many of the Khatmia initially supported the Egyptian-dominated Unionist Party solely as a means of ending British administration of the country. This element now resents Egypt's efforts to extend its influence and to manipulate Sudanese politics.

The Unionist Party won its victory in the November 1953 elections for the first Sudanese self-governing parliament, thanks largely to the popular support of the Khatmia. Prime Minister Azhari has accordingly sought to maintain a balance in the cabinet between Khatmia and prounionist politicians.

Ali Mirghani, head of the Khatmia, is considered the most influential figure on the Sudanese political scene. The growing friction between Mirghani and the Nasr regime constitutes a serious threat to Azhari's prounionist government. It also lessens the prospect that the Sudanese will choose political union with Egypt rather than independence when they vote on their future status at some date before January 1957.

Major Salah Salim's sudden and unexpected visit to Khartoum on 30 September to confer with Unionist Party officials suggests that the Nasr regime is concerned over the split within the party and Egypt's declining influence among the Khatmia. If Major Salim is unable to effect a reconciliation between the two factions, Egypt may expect a further loss of influence in the Sudan and increasing opposition to union of the two countries.

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SECRET**COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEW GOVERNMENT**

The choice of the men who will fill the principal positions in the new Chinese Communist government discloses significant changes in the relative standing of Chinese leaders, although the top four officials are not affected (see chart, p. 16). The election conducted in the Chinese National People's Congress in September supports indications of the past several years that the big four, in order, are Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh.

Mao, who is to be chairman of the Republic for four more years, will almost certainly remain in over-all control, although his activity may be reduced by ill-health. Liu, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, will be in a position to exercise power second only to Mao's and, apparently, to assume primary authority on Mao's death or incapacitation. Chou En-lai will continue as premier and foreign minister in the number three job. Chu Teh, as the only vice chairman of the Republic, will be the formal successor to Mao's office, although not to his authority.

Administration of government affairs is in the hands of the State Council, consisting of 35 ministers and commission chairmen and presided over by Chou En-lai. In nearly all cases, ministers who were replaced were named vice chairmen or members of the Standing Committee of the congress, where they will be under the supervision of Liu Shao-chi and will not have a direct hand in the daily administration of the government.

Peng Teh-huai, until recently commander of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, has apparently assumed direct control of the armed forces in place of former commander in chief Chu Teh. Peng was named as the new minister of national defense, a position he is expected to fill aggressively and well.

Both Peng and Chu are among the 15 vice chairmen of the new National Defense Council, as are all field army commanders. Since there is no direct command channel between this body and the new Ministry of National Defense, the council will probably function largely as an advisory body to Peng and to Mao Tse-tung, who heads the council.

The rapid rise of Teng Hsiao-ping in recent years was confirmed during the congress, as Peiping identified him for the first time as a member of the Chinese Communist Party

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politburo. Teng retained his position as a vice premier and was also appointed a vice chairman of the National Defense Council.

A similar rise in the stature of Li Fu-chun was confirmed by the congress, which named him to replace Kao Kang as chairman of the important State Planning Commission, one of the two or three top jobs in the Chinese Communist economy. Li, who may like Teng be a new member of the politburo, was formerly second in importance to Kao Kang in Manchuria.

The congress appeared to confirm the fall from favor of Kao Kang, long the party's boss in Manchuria and until this year one of Communist China's big five. Kao, who has been out of the news since January of this year, was not mentioned in any way during the congress session and has apparently been disciplined sharply for challenging the party leadership.

Li Li-san, onetime leader of the Chinese Communist Party and rival of Mao Tse-tung, was also dealt a blow by the congress, in that he was not retained as minister of labor or named to any other post. Li had been made the scapegoat in 1931 for the failure of the Comintern line in China in previous years, and was ordered to Moscow for reindoctrination. He returned to China in 1945, reportedly as a Kremlin-supported check on Mao, and was re-elected at that time to the party's central committee, but he never regained anything approaching his former power.

Two other major figures seem to be in trouble, judging from the proceedings of the congress. Jao Shu-shih, who had been director of the party's highly important organization department and the regime's top official in East China, was completely ignored by the congress. An Tzu-wen, a theorist who had been Jao's deputy in the organization department, lost his job as minister of personnel for the government when that post was eliminated by the congress, and he was not given any other job.

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GOVERNMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China		Chu Teh, Vice Chairman of the Republic	
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL		STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS	
Chairman		Chairman	
Mao Tse-tung		Liu Shao-chi	
Vice Chairmen		Vice Chairmen	
Chu Teh	Hsu Hsiang-chien	Soong Ching-ling	Huang Yen-pei
Peng Teh-huai	Nieh Jung-chen	Lin Po-chu	Peng Chen
Lin Piao	Yeh Chien-ying	Li Chi-shen	Li Wei-han
Liu Po-cheng	Cheng Chien	Chang Lan	Chen Shu-tung
Ho Lung	Chang Chih-chung	Lo Jung-huan	Dalai Lama
Chen Yi	Fu Tso-yi	Shen Chun-ju	Saifudin
Teng Hsiao-ping	Lung Yun	Kuo Mo-jo	
Lo Jung-huan			
81 Members		65 Members	
		STATE COUNCIL	
		Premier	
		Chou En-lai	
		Vice Premiers	
		Chen Yun	Ho Lung
		Lin Piao	Chen Yi
		Peng Teh-huai	Ulanfu
		Teng Hsiao-ping	Li Fu-chun
		Teng Tzu-hui	Li Hsien-nien

MINISTRIES AND COMMISSIONS

Minister of Internal Affairs:	Hsieh Chueh-tsai	Minister of the Textile Industry:	Chiang Kuang-nai
Minister of Foreign Affairs:	Chou En-lai	Minister of Light Industry:	Chia To-fu
Minister of Defense:	Peng Teh-huai	Minister of Local Industry:	Sha Chien-li
Minister of Public Security:	Lo Jui-ching	Minister of Railways:	Teng Tai-yuan
Minister of Justice:	Shih Liang	Minister of Communications:	Chang Po-chun
Minister of Supervision:	Chien Ying	Min. of Posts & Telecommunications:	Chu Hsueh-fan
State Planning Commission:	Li Fu-chun	Minister of Agriculture:	Liao Lu-yen
National Constr. Commission:	Po I-po	Minister of Forestry:	Liang Hsi
Minister of Finance:	Li Hsien-nien	Minister of Water Conservancy:	Fu Tso-yi
Minister of Food:	Chang Nai-chi	Minister of Labor:	Ma Wen-jui
Minister of Commerce:	Tseng Shan	Minister of Culture:	Shen Yen-ping
Minister of Foreign Trade:	Yeh Chi-chuang	Minister of Higher Education:	Yang Hsiu-feng
Minister of Heavy Industry:	Wang Ho-shou	Minister of Education:	Chang Hsi-jo
1st Min. of Machine Building:	Huang Ching	Minister of Public Health:	Li Teh-chuan
2nd Min. of Machine Building:	Chao Erh-lu	Physical Culture and Sports Comm.:	Ho Lung
Minister of Fuel Industries:	Chen Yu	Nationalities Affairs Comm.:	Ulanfu
Minister of Geology:	Li Ssu-kuang	Overseas Chinese Affairs Comm.:	Ho Hsiang-ning
Minister of Building:	Liu Hsiu-feng	Secretary General of State Council:	Hsi Chung-hsun

People's Supreme Court President: Tung Pi-wu
 Procurator General: Chang Ting-cheng

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